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Africa is commonly portrayed as the driver of a global “population explo-
sion.” The new publication Empty Planet (2019) contests this prevailing view. 
Worldwide, it argues, the peak of the population increase will soon be reached 
and declining fertility will be the real problem for humanity, potentially in Af-
rica too. The book’s thesis has received a great deal of attention. Rightly so?
 • It’s the prevailing opinion: The world population will have increased to 11 bil-
lion by the turn of the century. Empty Planet gives minority opinions a plat-
form. In 30 years the growth will tip, and the ageing population will become a 
significant problem around the world.
 • In reality the authors are using previously known data, focusing only on the 
most optimistic population trends. And the most unpredictable element is how 
the African continent will develop. Will the global trends reach Africa as well, 
and if so, when? The elephant in the room is the European fear of migration. 
Their development policy is promoting a new incentive to convince African 
leaders to invest more in family planning: the promise of a demographic divi-
dend. At the same time, more developed countries are trying to do the opposite: 
push up the fertility rate. They are failing.
 • Furthermore, there is some food for thought. Why do almost all societies ulti-
mately reach a fertility rate below the point of sustainability? How will shrink-
ing populations affect individual societies and the power play of nations?
 • Societies open to immigration may be able to cushion potential negative im-
pacts. It’s worth looking more closely at the statistics on fertility rates: Most 
people will be surprised to see that fertility rates have almost collapsed in doz-
ens of countries – and not just industrialised nations. There are impressive 
figures from Africa as well.
Policy Implications
Population growth is predicted to come to a peak at the end of this century, when 
the world’s fertility rates fall below reproduction. Whether the population growth 
culminates at 11 billion by 2100 or whether the tipping point is reached earlier 
depends on Africa. Shrinking populations in many other parts of the world may 
result in a shift in the international power play and economic difficulties in fi-
nancing countries’ social infrastructure. Societies open to immigration will do 
better than those that are closed and isolated. 
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We Might Be Lonely  
We might be lonely. In 30 years, the publication Empty Planet (2019) predicts, the 
trend of a “global population explosion” will shift and the world’s population will 
begin to shrink. Africa, commonly portrayed as the driver of the increase in world 
population, will follow. Thus Empty Planet contests this prevailing view. The world’s 
population will continue to shrink unchecked. With this thesis, the  canadians 
 Darrell Bricker, the CEO of Ipsos Public Affairs, a polling, research, marketing, and 
analysis company, and John Ibbitson, a journalist at canada’s national daily The 
Globe and Mail, shake up the familiar view that the world’s population is increas-
ing unabatedly. They argue that overpopulation will not be the problem, but rather 
an ageing population and a shrinking economy. This theory is not at all new, but as 
a minority opinion it has not received much attention in the past. And some of its 
earlier proponents might be considered biased. The German catholic News Agency 
headlined one article with: “UN admits for the first time: Population explosion is 
a myth” (n.d.). Thanks to an easy-to-read non-fiction title, the authors received a 
great deal of attention from weekly magazines. This is particularly intriguing as the 
book seems to offer a simple solution to a major problem. 
bricker and Ibbitson’s thesis comes at a time when foreign policy is broaching 
the topic of population development – at least more openly – for the first time. The 
proverbial elephant in the room is the subject of migration. The prevailing popular 
belief is that Africa is threatening to flood Europe. It is alleged that 37 per cent 
of  Africans want to leave their home countries, approximately two-thirds of them 
in the direction of Europe. And it does not get better. At the end of the century, 
the united Nations expects a world population of 10.9 billion people, an increase 
of 42 per cent (uN 2019), with growth focused in the countries of our southern 
 neighbours. 
Therefore, foreign policy no longer considers questions of family planning to be 
a niche subject that can be left to specialists in development cooperation – where it 
has hitherto been only one of many topics. In the past, diplomats have tried to avoid 
this contentious issue, which is peppered with ethical and religious traps. The argu-
ment that the much higher resource consumption of the rich is a greater threat than 
high birth rates lurks in each panel discussion. The right to reproductive autonomy 
is a universal human right, though in context it refers above all to the right to family 
planning – including information about contraception.
In 2019, the German Federal Foreign Office commissioned the Berlin Institute 
for Population and Development to undertake a study on the topic of population 
growth in Africa (Kaps, Schewe and Klingholz 2019). This is a clear sign that it is no 
longer seen as a distant development policy issue, but is affecting Germany’s foreign 
and security interests. The question is how to seek a soft and attractive, inoffensive 
broaching of the topic. The study offers a wealth of interesting aspects and is visu-
ally skilful thanks to numerous graphics. After Empty Planet has captured your at-
tention, it’s a helpful tool to think transversely.
According to Empty Planet, salvation appears to be close. The population bomb 
as predicted in the late 1960s by Anne and Paul Ehrlich (1968) is just an illusionary 
giant. The authors effectively counter all doomsday scenarios. Instead they paint 
the picture of a nursing home for the elderly 50 years from now. This deftly written 
and well-promoted book received significant attention from fellow journalists in the 
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united States. German journalists, as attentive readers of American publications 
always in search of a good story, took up the new topic. How much truth is there in 
the heretical claim that not too many children, but rather too many seniors, are the 
problem of the future?
It All Depends on How a Statistic Is Read
Who has been drawing the wrong conclusions from the statistics, the theorists of 
the population explosion or those of the population implosion? cynics may note 
that the common link in both scenarios is the downfall of humanity.
Almost all scenarios assume that the growth of the world's population is finite. 
It is just the question of when the peak will be reached that is contentious. The 
starting point of all calculations is the acceptance that the current population in 
2019 is 7.7 billion people, as calculated by the UN (2019). It is also undisputed that 
it is above all the African continent that will drive future growth: its population is 
expected to double to 2.6 billion by 2050. but how do we read the tea leaves for the 
second half of the century? 
UN statistics expect the inflection point to occur around the year 2100 at a 
population of approximately 11 billion. When they recently adjusted their numbers 
slightly downwards to just under 11 billion, critics celebrated this as an admission of 
failure. In sharp contrast to this are the authors of Empty Planet and their sources, 
who expect the vertex to occur between 2040 and 2060 at approximately nine bil-
lion and predict a return to today’s numbers by the end of the century. The driving 
factor is said to be urbanisation, followed by the combination of education and ac-
cess to contraceptives (Empty Planet 2019).
However, it is interesting that the authors overlook the fact that the uN has also 
prepared an array of future developments – and in the end settled on the middle 
scenario as the most probable one, with a peak in population development at 11 mil-
lion by the turn of the century. More and less promising versions are not concealed.
Grabbing Attention via Dramatisation
The authors of Empty Planet use the methods of journalistic dramatisation. The 
readability and interestingness of the subject benefit from exaggeration, at the ex-
pense of scientific accuracy and validity. The book’s weaknesses extend to the point 
of it being unreliable. At no point is there a graphic. The numbers are difficult to 
compare. Sometimes work is carried out in detail (for example, regarding the posi-
tive figures for Kenya), and sometimes basic data is missing (so there is no overall 
African forecast for 2050 or 2100). There have been other, previous reports predict-
ing population decline. In 2013 a report for Deutsche bank (Sanyal 2013) argued 
that “urbanization is the strongest contraceptive” and that we can expect the human 
fertility rate to fall to replacement figures by 2025. Critics of Empty Planet and its 
sources stress that these estimates have already proven to be too positive just six 
years later, if one believes the World Bank figures (World Bank 2019). 
There are many engaging moments for the amateur reader. Empty Planet opens 
the reader’s eyes to a potentially different viewpoint – for instance, a historical per-
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spective. This is particularly so for the baby boomers (the post-war generation up 
to the “pill gap” of the 1960s), who are about to retire but are still decision makers. 
Their focus on their own uniqueness makes them blind to the realisation that the 
baby bust has actually been a slip-up of an already declining fertility rate, a decline 
over 200 years – at least in parts of Europe such as France, where it was not pos-
sible to speak of urbanisation in the eighteenth century.
The uN does not hide the fact that more than half of humanity today lives in 
states where the fertility rate is below the reproductive rate of 2.1. These countries 
include some of the former drivers of growth: china, brazil, and South Korea, and 
soon India and Indonesia. The population in each of these states is still growing, 
but only because the younger people are having children, while the elderly enjoy 
increased life expectancy. Empty Planet focuses more closely on these facts and 
brings endless columns of pre-existent statistics to life. Even if one does not agree 
with the authors’ conclusion, this makes the book worth reading.
The Carrot for Africa – Do Not Miss the Demographic Dividend
The critical point of all these theories is the question of how population  development 
affects the economy. Do more people result in more consumers, and thus in more 
growth? This is the old capitalist thinking, as if The Limits to Growth (1972) had 
 never been published. This old-school thinking is represented by a number of  African 
leaders as well. Not all of them are as outspoken as Tanzania’s  president, John 
 Magafuli.  He refers, not unjustly, to his experience from visits to Europe, where 
govern ments are trying in vain to counteract the shrinking of their  populations. 
President Yoweri Museveni of uganda makes a similar argument. Many  others sim-
ply do not want to offend foreign donors by being too explicit on the issue. On the 
other hand, not many are as aggressive as Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, who 
rules a country with the highest population density in the world (519 people per 
square kilometre). He decided in 2012 to commit his government to family planning 
and has accelerated these measures over the intervening years.
Even if fertility rates drop, population growth will continue for at least some 
decades. Take the example of Rwanda, with 13 million people at present. People 
are living longer and the parents of the 20 millionth citizen of the year 2040 have 
already been born.
In the transition phase from a lower birth rate to a shrinking society, the pre-
vailing opinion in science promises a “demographic dividend.” This refers to the 
time when the population pyramid will shift its big belly from its very bottom to the 
young workers in their twenties, while at the bottom, with the newest generation, 
it will already be tapering off. More breadwinners and fewer dependents should 
generate a development window not to be missed by the African states. Asia sets 
the role model here. 
The idea of demographic change describes current development in Southeast 
Asia. There is no proof yet that it might automatically repeat itself in Africa. There, 
the young working-age population (between 15 and 35 years old) is growing by up 
to 12 million people per year, while only about three million new formal jobs are 
being created. Low life prospects, on the other hand, accelerate population growth. 
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The reduction in the fertility rate in most African countries is remarkable. The gen-
eral direction is a trend towards lower fertility rates. but there are doubts as to 
whether this will result in a demographic dividend. The condition for this is that 
there is also work for these young people. Yet just because there is a surplus of 
working people does not mean that it will automatically create work for them. Is 
this too pessimistic? Take the example of Tunisia, at present the most hopeful of 
all African candidates for a demographic dividend – if it is considered to be African 
at all. The country has achieved the economically favourable age structure of the 
demographic bonus. “but currently the country is far from being able to harness 
this potential; like almost everywhere in Africa, there are insufficient jobs for the 
large number of people of working age” (Kaps, Schewe, Klingholz 2019), admit the 
experts at the Berlin Institute for Population and Development.  
As yet the theory of a demographic dividend for the African continent remains 
speculation without proof. but it is the only argument that development experts 
have discovered so far in trying to convince hesitant rulers to commit to family 
planning. It might be considered a hypocritical argument from the perspective of a 
small developing country.
Hence the African chapter is the weak point of any thesis on a quick change in 
the development of the world’s population. Five of the nine countries that will con-
tribute most to population growth by 2050 are located in Africa: Egypt, Nigeria, DR 
congo, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. Over the next 30 years, half of the world's popula-
tion growth will be in Africa.
but the authors of Empty Planet expect that the trends from Europe, North 
and South America, and Asia will also be repeated in Africa. Indeed, they even rely 
on accelerated development. The uN, they say, is too pessimistic. However they do 
not provide evidence of this fact, only extrapolation of the previous trend. unfor-
tunately, the empirical figures support the opposite trend: “Fertility rates in Africa 
are sinking much more slowly than in other parts of the world” and “child num-
bers remain at a high level,” the authors of Africa’s Demographic Trailblazers state 
(Kaps, Schewe, Klingholz 2019).
Particularly with regard to the African continent, there is no lack of dooms-
day apologists. Take Serge Michailof in his Africanistan – Development or Jihad 
(2018): he considers major geopolitical and development issues to have the poten-
Fig. 1
Average number of 
children per woman, 
1990-1995 and 2015-
20120
Source: UN DESA; 
Kaps, Schewe, and 
Klingholz (2019).
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tial to impact Europe’s and the world’s stability. To him, Africa is a powder keg – 
with demographics as the powder, and unemployment the detonator.
Empty Planet’s projection appears even more speculative: As the bulk of the 
population slips into retirement age, the economy will shrink. The worst case for 
many African countries would be to reach this recession without enjoying the de-
mographic dividend first. This result is one that none of the recent publications dare 
to discuss.
To Be a Big Player, Population Size Matters
Foreign policy-makers may look at population changes from different perspectives. 
How do changing fertility rates affect the international power play? Of course, the 
size of a country’s population is not the only factor determining its international 
role – even if it is sometimes neglected as a major one. Let us apply a one-genera-
tion perspective – until the year 2050 – on the basis that size matters and economic 
growth needs a strong domestic market.
If this assumption is correct, Russia, one of the premier league players, is facing 
an additional problem to secure its position as it is already experiencing a declin-
ing population, with a birth rate of 1.7 children per woman. The UN (2019) expects 
Russia’s population to drop to 132 million in 2050 from 143 million today. china’s 
population (birth rate: 1.6 children per woman) is expected to shrink from today’s 
1.4 billion by 100 million people, a trend that will accelerate and not be cushioned 
by migration as most Asian countries do not enjoy the tradition of an immigration 
policy. At present, china is a perfect example that the demographic dividend ex-
ists – but by 2050 it will pay the price for an ageing society. 
The beneficiary might be an old player on the field, the US. Although it enjoys 
only a slightly higher birth rate per woman (1.9) than its competitors, its uninterrupted 
immigration rates mean that the domestic market should continue to see increasing 
demand from young buyers. The uS position would therefore not be endangered. It is 
not possible to predict how shrinking states will react in terms of foreign and eco-
nomic policy, but the domestic situation should not be disregarded.
Among the players of the second division, Japan seems particularly at risk of 
descent. For two decades, Tokyo has not managed to revive the economy, despite a 
zero interest rate policy. If one believes the theories of Empty Planet, the cause lies 
in the country’s population structure. For 30 years, the fertility rate has fallen below 
the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman – mostly to 1.4 (uN 2019). Already, 
Japan is the oldest society on earth – with all the accompanying, and expensive, 
consequences thereof for its social system. Japan has been shrinking since 2010 – 
perhaps not coincidentally at the same time it had to give up its place as the world’s 
second-largest industrial nation to china. 
Germany has been given temporary respite thanks to immigration. Regarding 
births per woman, despite a rise to 1.5 (uN 2019) it is still below the European union 
average. Remarkably, especially those Eu partners most opposed to immigration 
have even lower birth rates (Hungary 1.4; Poland 1.3). France leads with 1.9, and the 
united Kingdom is still growing – thanks to immigration and not taking into con-
sideration that London is currently scoring an own goal thanks to brexit. canada is 
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most likely to compensate for low birth rates (1.6), and thanks to a long-term im-
migration policy might be one of the future climbers. 
What of the shooting stars and newcomers: the Asian tigers and the remaining 
bRIcS nations? It is interesting to read which countries already have fertility rates 
well below 2.1 (uN 2019): Singapore, Macau, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea 
have among the lowest birth rates in the world, with the city states currently ac-
counting for the lowest. Other nations that are likely to surprise many readers are 
Brazil at 1.7 children, South Africa at 2.4, and India at 2.3. They could be candidates 
for the demographic dividend, as is the case in South Korea and china. India and 
brazil appear to be potential candidates for a bigger international role, as the baby 
boomers of the past are fuelling the economy, and the burdens of retirement are not 
yet palpable. However, population control alone might not be enough to kick them 
into the major league. 
There is not much news from the Middle East in this regard. The prediction 
(uN 2019) is that population growth has slowed down already – with the exception 
of Egypt. And the resource-rich countries of the region are building their future on 
factors that are beyond the question of whether a demographic dividend exists. 
Germany could stabilise its position with a clever immigration policy. The situ-
ation could be worse.
Influencing Birth Rates
There is something missing in all the studies, projections, and research on popula-
tion growth. It is the statisticians, the physicians, the sociologists, and the political 
scientists who deal with the issues of population development. The field lacks the 
views of biologists and behavioural researchers. Is Homo sapiens so different from 
its fellow creatures that it will self-destructively allow either uncontrollable growth 
or a shrinkage to zero? Do all the factors mentioned by the development experts – 
from education to urbanisation – describe the whole picture? It might be that a 
piece of the puzzle is missing that could explain why all the efforts – be it to increase 
or reduce human fertility – have not been more successful. 
To discuss the theory and implications of a shrinking world population, one 
does not have to be a member of the Flat Earth Society or in denial of the climate 
crisis. From the range of possible developments, the book Empty Planet has picked 
an interesting – and the most positive – of all possible scenarios – as long as the 
negative drama of the associated ageing is ignored. This does not exclude the pos-
sibility that the authors picked the correct scenario; any reputable work of science 
fiction is based on good research. But that is fiction, not science. It is not a scenario 
that politicians can base their decisions on. The population is growing now, espe-
cially in Europe’s neighbourhood, in Africa. And although we do not fully under-
stand the systematic causal chain, at least some of the elements appear obvious: 
give girls education and give women easy access to contraceptives, then let them 
take their own decisions. Only if that works will the human species have the luxury 
of reflecting on business and power in its old-age home, Earth.
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